

Message Text

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ACTION IO-13

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ACDA-07 INT-05 SAM-01 ARA-06

OMB-01 /109 W

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R 310615Z AUG 76

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3560

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMVLASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

RURHDMUAMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0432

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 1263

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJ: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF COLOMBO SUMMIT

REF: (A) STATE 204517, (B) DAMASCUS 5620 (NOTAL), (C) BAGHDAD 1022

1. SUMMARY: IRAQ IS MODERATELY PLEASED WITH THE COLOMBO SUMMIT. THE FUTURE DEDICATION, HOWEVER, OF THE MODERATES TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT MAY WANE. AT COLOMBO, GOI IN LOW-KEY MANNERQ PROVIDED MINIMUM SUPPORT FOR ITS FRIENDS AND WAS REWARDED WITH

NACC SEAT. GOI UNDERSTANDS U.S. CONCERN WITH KOREA AND PUERTO
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RICO, BUT IRAQ IS NOT GOING TO MAKE WAVES WITHIN NON-ALIGNED

MOVEMENT ON OUR BEHALF. END SUMMARY.

2. POLOFF AND I CALLED AUGUST 28 ON MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IZMET KETTANEH TO REVIEW COLOMBO NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT, AT WHICH HE HAS BEEN A LEADING IRAQI PARTICIPANT. KETTANEH'S MOST STRONGLY EXPRESSED OPINION WAS THAT NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT MAY BE GROWING TOO RADICAL FOR MODERATE MEMBERS. HE LAMENTED FACT THAT NUMBER OF MODERATES WERE REPRESENTED BY SUB-CABINET LEVEL PERSONALITIES, E.G. SAUDI ARABIA BY ITS AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL.

3. ON TWO ISSUES OF MOST INTEREST TO USA (PUERTO RICO AND KOREA) I READ TO KETTANEH STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE (STATE 212042) GIVING OUR FIRST OFFICIAL REACTION TO COLOMBO AND EMPHASIZED THWZ WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY SUPPORT IRAQ FELT IT COULD GIVE US ON THESE POINTS WITHIN NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENTS AND AT UN. I REPEATED WHAT HE ALREADY KNEW: THAT PUERTO RICO AND KOREA WERE AREAS IN WHICH U.S. HAS STRONG NATIONAL INTERESTS AND WE WOULD WATCH CAREFULLY THE POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES TAKEN BY OTHER NATIONS.

4. KETTANEH ASKED FOR COPY OF U.S. PRESS DEPARTMENT RELEASE WHICH HE SAID HE WANTED TO INCORPORATE IN HIS PENDING WRAPUP REPORT TO MFA ON COLOMBO SUMMIT AND ITS AFTERMATH. I REVIEWED HISTORY OF U.S.-PUERTO RICO RELATIONSHIP. KETTANEH SEEMED GENUINELY SURPRISED THAT WE CONSIDER PUERTO RICO A PURELY DOMESTIC ISSUE AND HE APPEARED TO HAVE STRONG PERSONAL IMPRESSION THAT PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT ENJOYED SUPPORT OF A MUCH LARGER MINORITY IN PUERTO RICO THAN IS THE CASE. HE TOOK NOTE OF THE U.S. POSITION BUT SAID THAT NON-ALIGNED ATTENTION TO PUERTO RICO IS TFWO ALMOST ENGRAINED IN THE LITURGY OF THE MOVEMENT AND IS NOT LIKELY TO CEASE.

5. ON KOREA: ACCORDING KETTANEH NORTH KOREANS MADE PESTS OF SELVES WITH IRAQIS AND OTHER DELEGATIONS, WITH INCESSANT JAWBONING AND ARMGRABBING IN THE CORRIDORS. ALTHOUGH IRAQ, HE SAID, NEITHER SPOKE FOR NOR SPONSORED NORTH KOREA'S POSITION, IRAQ DID VOTX FOR NORTH KOREAN LANGUAGE. HE OPINED THAT LANGUAGE ON KOREA MIGHT INDEED HAVE BEEN LESS RADICAL IF COMMITTEE HAD BEEN GIVEN MORE TIME TO STUDY AND DEBATE ISSUE BUT UNDER TIME

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PRESSURE, MOTION WAS VIRTUALLY WAVED THROUGH BY EXHAUSTED PARTICIPANTS. KIM IL SUNG'S ABSENCE AT LEAST PREVENTED QUESTION FROM ASSUMING MAJOR IMPORTANCE. KETTANEH WAS PERSONALLY DELIGHTED THAT NORTH KOREA WAS NOT ELECTED TO COORDINATING COMMITTEE. HE SAID THAT, BY GIVING "UNANIMOUS" APPROVAL OF VIETNAMESE CANDIDACY OVER NORTH KOREA'S, CONFEREES WERE REWARDING POLISHED VIETNAMESE BEHAVIOR AT CONFERENCE AND REBULKING PRESUMPTUOUS, SELF-IMPORTANT NORTH KOREANS. HE ASSED THAT NO ONE WANTED TO SEE

PYONGYANG THE SITE OF 1978 NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.

6. OTHER ISSUES:

LEBANON: KETTANEH PLAYED DOWN IRAQI SUPPORT FOR PLO IN LATTER'S CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIA AT THE SUMMIT. PLO'S PROPOSAL TO CIRCULATE DRAFT CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON AND PUBLIC ATTACK ON SYRIA WAS NOT BAGHDAD'S IDEA. WHILE EGYPTIANS WORKED WITH PLO, IRAQ PROVIDED ONLY SUPPORT IT CONSIDERED TO BE "MINIMUM" NECESSARY. IRAQIS ALSO PUBLICLY RESTATED THEIR WELL-KNOWN POSITION CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON.

7. MIDDLE EAST IN GENERAL: IRAQIS TRIED NOT TO "GET OUT IN FRONT" OF OTHER ARAB STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THERE SHOULD EVER EMERGE A GROUP OF ARAB STATES THAT SUPPORTED STRONGER MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL, IRAQ WOULD GLADLY GO ALONG.

8. CONCLUSION: KETTANEH EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE BAGHDAD PRESS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS HERE DURING COLOMBO MAY HAVE PLAYED UP IRAQ'S "RADICAL" IMAGE, NONETHELESS IRAQI APPROACH TO NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT WAS IN FACT PRAGMATIC, COOPERATIVE, AND REAPED DIVIDENDS. IRAQ HAS BEEN ELECTED TO THE NACC, BELIEVES THE 1982 SUMMIT WILL BE HELD IN BAGHDAD (THE CONFERENCE FORMALLY TOOK NOTE OF IRAQ'S DESIRE TO HOST THIS SUMMIT), AND ALLOWED EGYPT AND THE ALGERIANS TO STEP OUT IN FRONT ON THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES AMONG THE ARAB FAMILY. CAIRO'S FAILURE TO BE SUPPORTED BY AFRICAN NATIONS FOR ELECTIONS TO COORDINATING COMMITTEE AND EGYPT'S SUPPORT FOR THE PLO AGAINST THE SYRIANS LESSENERED CAIRO'S INFLUENCE AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED. SAME WAS TRUE OF ALGERIA BECAUSE OF LATTER'S PREOCCUPATION WITH SHARAN CONFLICT. ACCORDING KETTANEH, IRAQ APPEARS TO HAVE GAINED SOME GROUND WITH MORE MODERATE NATIONS AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED COMMUNITY. CONFIDENTIAL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NONALIGNED NATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 31 AUG 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976BAGHDA01263
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760329-1369
From: BAGHDAD
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t1976085/aaaaadmb.tel
Line Count: 155
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 STATE 204517, 76 DAMASCUS 5620, 76 BAGHDAD 1022
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <12 MAY 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <07 SEP 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF COLOMBO SUMMIT
TAGS: PFOR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006